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THE TRIBAL FRANCHISE: AN EXPRESSION OF TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY AND A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE 
PROBLEM OF MASS DISENROLLMENT 
 
By Brent K. Mulvaney* 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized the inherent right of 
tribal sovereignty, i.e. a diminished form of complete sovereignty 
that consists of the right of internal self-government, since the 19th 
century.1 This right entails a subset of other legally recognized 
rights, one of which is the right to determine tribal membership.2 
Recently, tribal attorneys and other scholars in Indian law have been 
puzzling over the scope of this right in relation to the developing 
trend of mass disenrollment.3 Although it is a disheartening fact that 
those facing disenrollment may be deprived of their identities, their 
communities, and their rights as tribal citizens, it is perhaps hubristic 
to assume that these problems can—or should be—solved by 
entreating either the federal judiciary or Congress to protect the 
rights of the individual Indian over that of his or her tribe. Whether 
tribes have—or ought to have—an absolute right to determine not 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seattle University School of Law. I am of Native 
Hawaiian ancestry, and I have several connections to other American 
Indigenous communities. In my future legal career, I hope to work with Indian 
tribes, but I am deeply committed to promoting social justice for all indigenous 
communities. The opinions that I share in this article are entirely my own, but 
they are also my honest reflections on the thoughts and feelings that people who 
are both genuine and genuinely Native have shared with me. This article is not 
meant to impugn actions that are actual expressions of tribal sovereignty or the 
motives of those that truly wish to preserve the integrity of their communities. I 
do not think that anyone wishes to be or represent themselves as unjust. But we 
all need to learn how to treat each other with the respect that we all deserve as 
humans and fellow members in the several overlapping communities that we are 
a part of, especially when we find ourselves in positions of authority. Thanks to 
everyone who supplied me with inspiration and support, but particularly the 
Geary family and the talented editors at the American Indian Law Journal. 
1 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886); Cherokee Nation 
v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831). 
2 E.g., Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1897); Red Bird v. United States, 
203 U.S. 76, 77 (1906); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 n.18 
(1978). 
3 E.g., Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal 
Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 383 (2015). 
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only the criteria for enrollment but also that for disenrollment is an 
issue complicated by an overarching concern that the application of 
any positive limit upon the sovereign rights of tribes will necessarily 
strip away essential features of tribal self-government. Such a 
stripping-away would then potentially expose or produce a 
vulnerability of tribal sovereignty while enhancing and justifying 
the expansion of federal controls over the internal operations of 
tribes.   
 While it is true that we must be mindful of potential 
encroachments by the federal government upon tribal governance, 
the ethical conflict surrounding mass disenrollment lies in the false 
assertion that any acknowledgement of an absolute right to tribal 
citizenship will lead to a diminishment of tribal sovereignty. Much 
of the litigation surrounding mass disenrollment actions indicates 
that those actions could not proceed without the depreciation of an 
all-important aspect of tribal membership, the tribal franchise.4 The 
right to vote, if recognized by a governing body, is not only a 
primary feature of citizenship, it is the primary instrument of a fully 
developed sense of tribal autonomy and an effective means for the 
protection of due process rights.  As such, this article will focus 
primarily on why the preservation of the tribal franchise is a 
necessary means to securing tribal citizenship that enhances, rather 
than impugns, tribal sovereignty. 
 In Part II, this article will provide an analysis of the 
development of legal notions concerning tribal identity. Rather than 
recognizing the processes of self-identification utilized by tribes and 
their members, the federal government sought to define Native 
peoples and their societies in accordance with a Euro-centric 
worldview. Consequently, sovereign tribes were deemed separate 
from their “subservient members,” and because the roots of tribal 
sovereignty rest in the combined will of the general membership of 
a tribe, that sovereignty was obscured and potentially diminished. 
When Native societies did not conform with colonial expectations, 
those expectations were imposed upon the tribes through legislation. 
Although the internal machinations of the tribes were disrupted by 
this imposition, both the many tribes and the federal government 
recognized a means by which the sovereignty of a tribe could be 
expressed directly, the tribal franchise. Because of the manipulation 
of tribal governments at the hands of Congress, tribal members are 
                                                
4 See discussion infra Part III.B–E. 
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now in a position where they must protect their sovereignty and 
utilize it to preserve their rights as tribal citizens.   
 In Part III, this article will analyze whether disenrollment is 
an expression of tribal sovereignty or a potential attack on its 
foundation. The section will begin by critiquing arguments that have 
been utilized to suggest that tribes have a sovereign right to disenroll 
their members. The section will close with an analysis of how 
disenrolling tribes have diminished the foundations of their 
sovereign authority by explicitly disregarding the combined will of 
tribal members for the purpose of extinguishing the rights of 
potential disenrollees. 
 In Part IV, this paper will conclude by presenting an 
argument as to why enhanced protection of the tribal franchise can 
serve as a remedy for the disenrollment epidemic while promoting 
tribal sovereignty. Because historical evidence of the distinction 
between a tribe and its members—aside from that produced by the 
federal government—is wholly lacking, it is important for tribal 
attorneys and Indian law scholars to recognize tribal sovereignty as 
the sovereignty of a tribe as a whole, i.e. a community of individual 
Indians who exercise their sovereignty through the tribal franchise. 
The only way to reclaim this more traditional notion of tribal 
sovereignty is for tribal members to actively strive for the 
unification of their combined will with that of the tribe through 
active political participation. In order for such efforts to prove 
successful, tribal members must not only fully exercise their voting 
rights but also encourage the enactment of constitutional provisions 
that will preserve those rights for future generations. If these efforts 
are successful, the threat of unjust disenrollment will be 
substantially abated if not completely neutralized.  
 
II.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRIBAL IDENTITY 
 
  There are few forces that have operated throughout the 
course of human history that are as politically and culturally 
disruptive as colonization. As a result, our notions concerning the 
traditional political identities of American Indians have either been 
distorted by a monocular and distinctly colonial perspective or were 
never formed due to Euro-American ambivalence or disinterest.5 
                                                
5 See Martha C. Knack, Women and Men, in A COMPANION TO THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 51, 61 (Thomas Biolsi ed., 2004). 
 4 
The anthropological record concerning traditional tribal political 
structures does, however, indicate that early tribes were 
organizational manifestations of kinship and, to a lesser extent, a 
shared locus of activity.6 Further, the kinship bond exhibited in tribal 
organizations is not bound by blood alone, for it may also be based 
on adoption.7 In addition to notions of tribal identity based primarily 
on kinship, early anthropological studies indicate that the identity of 
a tribal community was necessarily intertwined with tribal 
sovereignty, for the political actions of a tribe were generally 
dictated by consensus.8  
Moreover, the delegation of political authority within a tribe 
was an inherently biological process; a tribal community would 
adhere to the guidance of “situation-specific leaders” who had 
demonstrated the skills required to address a persisting communal 
need.9 As a result of European colonization, these once-fundamental 
features of tribal politics were frustrated, obscured, and 
paradoxically rejected for being in conflict with tribal self-
determination. This process, which continues to influence the 
American legal conception of tribal identity, has been furthered by 
three major forces: (1) the federal government’s bilateral influence 
on the study of indigenous communities, (3) the devaluation of 
historical anthropological data, and (3) federal Indian policy that 
altered the structure and identity of tribal organizations. These 
externalities, rather than Native traditions, have encouraged tribal 
governments to adopt policies establishing a pronounced 
demarcation between community and sovereignty that can only be 
overcome by the democratic process as envisaged in the tribal 
franchise. It is this schism in tribal identity and the diminishment of 
tribal voting rights that allow tribal governments to unilaterally 
disenroll the members of a tribe. 
While scholars in the field of anthropology have historically 
pursued the goal of widespread intercultural competency, 
                                                
6 See, e.g., Raymond J. DeMaille, Kinship: The Foundation for Native American 
Society, in STUDYING NATIVE AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 306, 331 
(Russell Thornton Ed., 1998); Loretta Fowler, Politics, in A COMPANION TO THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 69, 70 (Thomas Biolsi ed., 2004). 
7 J. W. Powell, From Barbarism to Civilization, 1 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 98, 
108 (1888). 
8 Knack, supra note 5, at 61. 
9 Id. 
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ethnography was developed in order to promote colonial aims.10 
Such developments are the products of what professor Les W. Field  
refers to as “official anthropology”: the process of adapting 
anthropological knowledge to the ontological demarcation of Native 
identities for the purpose of shaping official government policies.11 
It is this form of anthropology, having been employed by the federal 
government, which serves as the foundation of extratribal legal 
conceptions of both tribal and American Indian identities.  
 
A.   The Lockean Influence on Concepts of American  
Indian Identity 
 
While not anthropological per se, the political theory of John 
Locke can be seen as a prototype for later works in official 
anthropology concerning American Indians. In writing his Second 
Treatise of Government, Locke proceeded under the assumption that 
there was once a “state of nature” that served as the bottom rung of 
the socio-evolutionary ladder.12 After laying the foundation for this 
concept, he then argues that this “state of nature” had its 
contemporary counterpart in a generalized Native American 
society.13 Aside from using this comparison to suggest the primitive 
nature of American Indians, Locke introduced two ideas that would 
profoundly influence early ethnographic studies and assimilationist 
policies in America: He argued that the primitive nature of tribes 
inhibited their abilities to develop into fully-functioning agrarian 
societies,14 and he argued that—as primitive people—Native 
Americans must have adopted the most primitive form of 
commonwealth which he identified as monarchy.15 The first of these 
assertions provided strong support for the soon to be popular notion 
that the proper development of Native society required the paternal 
                                                
10 Peter Whitely, Ethnography, in A COMPANION TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS 435, 436 (Thomas Biolsi ed., 2004). 
11 Les W. Field, Unacknowledged Tribes, Dangerous Knowledge: The 
Muwekma Ohlone and How Indian Identities are “Known,” 18 WICAZO SA 
REV. 79, 80 (2003). 
12 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8–14 (C. B. Macpherson 
ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc. 1980) (1690). 
13 Id. at 29 (“[I]n the beginning all the world was America”). 
14 See Id. at 25–30 (Arguing that Native Americans failed to utilize their land 
and other natural resources in a way that would produce value for and sustain 
their communities). 
15 Id. at 55–56 (Providing a narrative account of how child-like primitive man 
submitted to the rule of a common father).  
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guidance of a more fully developed European nation. The second of 
these assertions served to obscure the kinship bonds and communal 
leadership that traditionally served as the basis for tribal 
organizations. 
 Not only is Locke’s second-hand critique of Native 
American society objectionable from an ethical stand-point, it is 
objectionable in two major ways from an academic stand-point 
because there is evidence that he selectively and intentionally 
omitted sources that undermined his arguments from his work.16 
First, while Locke’s assertions reflected the commonly held belief 
that English technology was superior to that which could be found 
in America at the time,17 they contradicted early accounts of English 
settlers whose survival depended on the actions of Native peoples. 
For example, Edward Winslow, an early settler of Plymouth Colony, 
wrote a letter in 1621 that provides three points of contention with 
Locke’s later work: Winslow recounted (1) how the plantation at 
Plymouth adopted Native agricultural practices, (2) how settlers 
experienced difficulties in adapting English farming methods to the 
newfound environment, and (3) how Indians provided the settlement 
with an abundance of oysters and venison.18 Such observations were 
confirmed by William Wood in 1639, who again emphasized the 
unparalleled generosity of the Natives of New England and the 
extent to which those Indians instructed English settlers in the 
planting and harvesting of Indian corn “by teaching [them] to cull 
out the finest seede, to observe the fittest season, to deepe distance 
for holes, and fit measure for hills, to worme it, and weede it; to 
prune it, and dresse it as occasion shall require.”19 Rather than 
indicating a lack of subsistence in Native communities, such 
accounts indicate the reliance of early English settlers on the 
generosity, communal nature, and traditional agricultural practices 
of Native peoples.  
                                                
16 See Morag Barbara Arneil, ‘All the World Was America’: John Locke and the 
American Indian 52–70 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
College London) (on file with the University College London Library) (Arguing 
that Locke omitted references to material in his possession when it would 
weaken his arguments). 
17 KAREN ORDAHL KUPPERMAN, SETTLING WITH THE INDIANS: THE MEETING OF 
ENGLISH AND INDIAN CULTURES IN AMERICA, 1580–1640 81 (1980). 
18 EDWARD WINSLOW & WILLIAM BRADFORD, MOURT’S RELATION OR JOURNAL 
OF THE PLANTATION AT PLYMOUTH 131–37 (Henry Martin Dexter ed., John 
Kimball Wiggin 1865) (1622). 
19 WILLIAM D. WOOD, WOOD’S NEW-ENGLAND’S PROSPECT 77–79 (Boston, 
John Wilson & Son 1865) (1639) (original spelling preserved).  
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Furthermore, these observations provide grounds for 
rejecting the supposition that Native societies were ever in need of 
the paternal guidance of European nations. However, the prejudicial 
assumptions underlying Locke’s work and colonial fervor continued 
to shape a common European perception of Native peoples, 
including that of Edward Winslow who, in spite of his sharing in an 
abundance of Native resources, remarked on how the pristine—
unworked and uninhabited—condition of American riverbanks 
would “grieve the hearts” of Englanders whose rivers were heavily 
burdened by human habitation.20 As will become evident, this 
tendency to confirm prejudicial assumptions is a common theme 
throughout the development of American conceptions of tribal 
identities. 
 Secondly, Locke’s understanding of the monarchical 
structure of Native society, while perhaps in conformity with the 
observations of the untrained settler, contradicted the observations 
of one of the primary sources cited in his Second Treatise. In the 
passage concerning the primacy of monarchical rule and its presence 
in America, Locke makes a parenthetical reference to the empires of 
Peru and Mexico.21  Because of his familiarity with the work of José 
de Acosta, who documented the historical development of 
indigenous societies in both Peru and Mexico, it has been suggested 
that Locke’s socio-evolutionary theory, including the idea of the 
primacy of the monarchical form of government, derives from 
Acosta’s earlier work.22 While this seems likely, it is abundantly 
clear that Locke was rather selective in choosing what material of 
Acosta’s he would adopt as part of his own philosophy.  
To illustrate this point and affirm an accurate conception of 
traditional tribal societies in America, it will suffice to focus on two 
of the many points of contention in the works of these scholars. First, 
Acosta writes that the original societies in Peru were “comminalties 
. . . governed by the advice and authoritie of many, which are as it 
were Counsellors.”23 In the same text, Acosta indicates that the first 
inhabitants of New Spain were likely arranged either in 
                                                
20 WINSLOW & BRADFORD, supra note 18, at 137. 
21 LOCKE, supra note 12, at 56. 
22 William G. Batz, The Historical Anthropology of John Locke, 35 J. HIST. 
IDEAS 663, 670 (1974). 
23 2 JOSEPH DE ACOSTA, THE NATURAL & MORAL HISTORY OF THE INDIES 426 
(Clements R. Markham ed., Edward Grimston trans., London, The Hakluyt 
Society 1880) (1604) (original spelling preserved). 
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commonalties or were “barbarous, . . . without law, without King, 
and without any certaine place of abode, [wandering] in troupes like 
savage beasts.”24 As such, Acosta’s work indicates a far closer 
relationship between indigenous communities and indigenous 
sovereignty than that found within a monarchy, a form of rule in 
which the reigns of power are perhaps furthest removed from the 
general populous. Lastly, Acosta’s work comports with the modern 
notion of a traditional tribal election process informed by communal 
perception and initiated in response to a persisting communal need. 
He writes, “[M]any nations of the Indies have not indured any Kings 
or absolute soveraigne Lords, but live in comminalities, creating and 
appointing Captains and Princes for certain occasions onely, to 
whom they obey during the time of their charge, then after they 
returne to their former estates.”25  
Given the foregoing statements, why, then, did Locke claim 
that monarchy was the first commonwealth both generally and in the 
Americas? The answer is simple: Neither Acosta nor Locke 
accepted commonalties and “barbarous societies” as genuine 
commonwealths, i.e. political organizations serving the common 
weal. In describing the societies he found in New Spain, Acosta 
writes, “[In] the greatest part of [the] new world . . . there are no 
settled kingdoms nor established commonweales, neither princes 
nor succeeding kings.”26 Locke’s concurrence is evident from his 
claiming that Native societies fail to properly cull value from their 
land and, as a result, adequately provide for their communities.27 
These attitudes once again demonstrate how externally applied 
notions of Native identity were shaped by Eurocentrism, in this case 
affirming the idea that a traditional notion of tribal sovereignty is 
divorced from communal decision-making. 
 
B.   The Bureau of American Ethnology 
And the Era of Assimilation 
 
To fully understand how European prejudices shaped the 
federal government’s understanding of American Indians and their 
societies, one ought to first look to the formative years of the federal 
agency concerned with the study and classification of Native 
                                                
24 Id. at 427. 
25 Id. at 410 (original spelling preserved). 
26 Id. (original spelling preserved). 
27 See LOCKE, supra note 12, at 25–30. 
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peoples: the Smithsonian Institution’s Bureau of American 
Ethnology (BAE). The BAE was created in 1879 by Congress with 
the express purpose of shaping federal Indian policy.28  
The formation of the BAE was prompted in part by John 
Wesley Powell, the man who would later become the head of that 
agency. In a report to the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) 
submitted in 1878, Powell argued that the federal government had 
previously failed to convince Natives to accept early assimilationist 
efforts on account of the dearth of ethnographic data available at the 
time.29 In particular, Powell identified the primary obstacles to 
assimilationist efforts as the inability of the federal government to 
overcome and/or apprehend tribal organizations based on kinship 
and communal ownership, including potential conflicts between 
tribal customs and the idea of privately owned allotments and 
inheritance, and the role of a chief as a speaker—rather than ruler—
of a pure democracy.30 According to Powell, ethnographic research 
was required to address the “Indian problem” that resulted from the 
cohabitation of “the white man and the Indian,” the solution to 
which involved understanding the “primitive” facets of Native 
society so that they might be overthrown in favor of modern societal 
features that would facilitate social evolution.31 Powell’s statements 
demonstrate the BAE’s conflicting intentions; the anthropological 
concern for mapping genuine characteristics of tribal identity was 
shackled to prejudicial notions concerning the inferiority of what 
Powell identified as a dying, primitive Native way of life.32 
This founding philosophy of the BAE was also influenced 
by Powell’s colleague Lewis Morgan. Prior to the formation of the 
BAE, Morgan—like Powell in his letter to the secretary—wrote on 
the desirability of using ethnological data to support the “future 
elevation” of Native peoples to the “position of citizens of the 
                                                
28 George Pierre Castile, Federal Indian Policy and Anthropology, in A 
COMPANION TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 268, 271–72 
(Thomas Biolsi ed., 2004). 
29 J. W. POWELL, REPORT ON THE METHODS OF SURVEYING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
15 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1878). 
30 Id. at 15–16. 
31 Id. at 15. 
32 See id. (“[I]n a very few years it will be impossible to study our North 
American Indians in their primitive condition except from recorded history.”) 
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State”33 and on the decline of the “ethnic life of the Indian tribes.”34 
However, the most influential concept advanced by Morgan was his 
formulation of social evolution based a on a succession of “Ethnical 
Periods” divided into three main categories—savagery, barbarism, 
and civilization—each of which, save the last, were divided into 
three subcategories—lower, middle, and upper.35 Morgan asserted 
that tribal societies could generally be classified as lying between 
upper savagery and lower barbarism with some exceptions,36 
whereas even “remote ancestors of the Aryan nations” had 
developed societal forms that could be deemed modern 
civilizations.37 Of all the factors that affected “ethnical 
advancement” none was more important  than the succession of the 
arts of subsistence; in Morgan’s view, “the whole question of human 
supremacy on the earth” depended upon a progression from 
rudimentary means of subsistence, to pastoralism, and then to field 
agriculture.38 For these reasons, Morgan felt federal Indian policy 
should be founded on a commitment to gradually assimilate Native 
peoples into American society,39 a point which he communicated to 
President Hayes directly, stating that “the Indian cannot civilize . . . 
any more than our own remote ancestors[ could skip over] ethnical 
periods.”40 In order to facilitate this transition, he advanced the 
following program:  
 
The next condition into which the Indian tribes 
would naturally advance is the pastoral. . . . [T]he 
government should help them by furnishing herds of 
                                                
33 LEWIS H. MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE HO-DÉ-NO-SAU-NEE OR IROQUOIS ix–x 
(Herbert M. Lloyd ed., Dodd, Mead & Co. 1901) (1851). 
34 LEWIS H. MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY OR RESEARCHES IN THE LINES OF 
HUMAN PROGRESS FROM SAVAGERY, THROUGH BARBARISM TO CIVILIZATION 
viii (Henry Holt & Co. 1877). 
35 Id. at 8–12. 
36 Id. at 10–11. 
37 See id. at 8. 
38 See id. at 19–27. 
39 See Letter from Lewis H. Morgan to President Rutherford B. Hayes (July 31, 
1877), in BERNARD J. STERN, LEWIS HENRY MORGAN: SOCIAL EVOLUTIONIST 
55 (Russell & Russell 1967) (1931) (“[Indians] are neither devoid of intelligence 
nor incapable of appreciating the usual incentives of human action. It will be 
found possible to stimulate their industry and to lead them gradually into the 
practice of labor, and with it into an improved plan of life.”). 
40 Letter from Lewis H. Morgan to President Rutherford B. Hayes (Aug. 6, 
1877), in BERNARD J. STERN, LEWIS HENRY MORGAN: SOCIAL EVOLUTIONIST 
58 (Russell & Russell 1967) (1931). 
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cattle and by sending herdsmen to care for them until 
they can be made to see that the natural increase will 
afford them an abundant meat and milk subsistence. 
. . . In time they will raise cattle in millions . . . and 
make a proper use of regions of no present use or 
value to our people.41 
 
From this, it can be seen that Morgan’s work—which would later be 
advanced by the BAE—represented an earnest, albeit extremely 
Eurocentric, attempt to align assimilationist policies with what he 
felt was the true and present condition shared by Native 
communities. 
 While the assimilationist movement—whose aims were 
most fully recognized in the Dawes Act42—adopted portions of the 
foundational theories advanced by Powell and Morgan, there is little 
evidence that their actual policy concerns were accepted by the 
federal government. Judging by the history of American Indian 
assimilation, Professor Lee Baker’s observation that the field of 
American anthropology “gained power and prestige because 
ethnologists articulated theory and research that resonated with the 
dominant discourse on race” was not only a truism but also a 
positive limitation on the valuation of the BAE’s work as it 
pertained to federal Indian policy.43 In accordance with this theory, 
the federal government established policies aimed at excising the 
most “anti-progressive” features of tribal identity in order to 
accelerate a process of acculturation aimed at “civilizing” Native 
peoples as rapidly as possible, a process wholly divorced from any 
anthropological concern for truly understanding, preserving, or 
accounting for the genuine status or gradual development of Native 
societies.44 
Clearly, Secretary Henry M. Teller employed some degree 
of ethnographic understanding when he prompted the establishment 
of Courts of Indian Offenses and the promulgation of the Code of 
                                                
41 Id. 
42 See discussion infra at 10–14. 
43 LEE D. BAKER, FROM SAVAGE TO NEGRO: ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE, 1896-1954 27 (Univ. of Cal. Press, Ltd. 1998) (1966). 
44 See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE 
YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1780–1834 156–57 
(1962). 
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Indian Offenses in 1883.45 In his letter to then Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Hiram Price, Teller identified several practices of 
Native peoples which taken together would prove to be a “great 
hindrance to the civilization of the Indians”: (1) particular feasts and 
dances, (2) plural marriage, (3) all practices of medicine men, and 
(4) burial rites involving the destruction of the property of the 
deceased.46 Given Teller’s concerns, Price then established the Code 
of Indian Offenses, outlawing these practices.47 He also created 
several Courts of Indian Offenses at various reservations in which a 
tribunal of three Indians would be appointed by an Indian agent to 
judicially enforce the code.48 As such, these acts of the federal 
government not only mandated the policing of Native identity but 
also delegated that task to a small subset of a tribe’s membership, 
who—in fulfilling their mandate under the direction of an Indian 
agent—would likely starve or imprison so-called Indian offenders 
until they could demonstrate that they no longer adhered to once-
sacred aspects of their cultural identity.49 Further, the Act served as 
an endorsement of the federal government’s paternal role in 
determining how tribal identity would be defined in the future. 
After thoroughly disrupting Native religious practices and 
forcing tribes to adopt a system of centralized adjudicative authority, 
Congress furthered its policy of forced assimilation by passing the 
Dawes Act of 1887, also known as the General Allotment Act 
(GAA).50  The GAA is typically recognized as an act requiring the 
apportionment of tribally owned lands so that they might be allotted 
to tribal members on a roughly per capita basis modified in 
accordance with an allottee’s familial status.51 Additionally, those 
individual allotments would— upon creation—be held in trust on 
the behalf of each allottee by the federal government, rendering 
                                                
45 See U.S. OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, REGULATIONS OF THE INDIAN 
DEPARTMENT, WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING THE FORMS USED 86–88 
(Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1884). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 88–91. 
48 Id. at 88. 
49 Generally, cultural offenses were punishable by imprisonment while 
subsequent offenses were punishable by a denial of rations. Additionally, those 
engaged in the practices of medicine men could be imprisoned until they could 
prove that they would forever abandon those practices, whereas those practicing 
polygamy or failing to adequately provide for their families could be denied 
rations for as long as the offense continued. Id. at 88–91. 
50 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–81). 
51 Id.  
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those lands inalienable but also unburdened by taxation, for a period 
of twenty-five years.52 However, lands that remained under tribal 
ownership after those allotments were made became “surplus” land, 
the sale of which was opened to the public.53  
The GAA was eventually amended by the Burke Act in 
1906.54 That Act authorized the Secretary to issue fee patents for an 
allotment during a trust term after determining its possessor to be 
sufficiently “competent.”55 Soon after, several competency 
commissions were established to more rapidly convert allotted lands 
held in trust to lands held in fee so as to open them up for sale to 
non-Indians.56 The initial effects of these enactments were the 
diminishment of the tribal land base and the privatization of land 
ownership in Indian country. However, the proclaimed intended 
result of this push for diminishment and privatization was to force 
individual Indians to engage in agriculture by severely restricting 
their ability to engage in other more traditional subsistence 
practices.57  
These enactments and the policies that they embody both 
converged with and diverged from the course of assimilation and 
related policy concerns put forward by Powell and Morgan. While 
Powell encouraged a level of understanding that is not in any way 
reflected in the GAA, he identified aspects of Native society that 
were counterintuitive to and, therefore, must be overthrown in order 
to achieve civilization.58 In particular, Powell viewed the concept of 
communal ownership and inheritance as a social concept that was 
detrimental to the goal of assimilation.59 It is in regard to this topic 
that Powell provides an illustration of one potential path to 
civilization:  
 
Among [certain tribes,] much property has been 
accumulated, and with the increase of their wealth 
                                                
52 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2012). 
53 25 U.S.C. § 402 (2012). 
54 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349). 
55 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2012). 
56 See generally Janet McDonnell, Competency Commissions and Indian Land 
Policy, 1913–1920, 11 S.D. HIST. 21 (1981) (detailing how the federal 
government coerced tribes into ceding their lands). 
57 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS FOR THE 
YEAR 1885 88 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1886) [hereinafter 1885 
REPORT]. 
58 Powell, supra note 29, at 15. 
59 Id. 
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the question of inheritance and individual ownership 
has at last spontaneously sprung up, and . . . these 
tribes are intensely agitated on the subject; the parties 
holding radical sentiments are rapidly increasing, 
and it is probable that soon . . . the customs of 
civilization in this respect will be adopted.60 
 
The above passage could be understood as indicating an 
institutional conflict between a present state—defined in part by the 
presence and accumulation of wealth—and past customs that (from 
Powell’s perspective) were outmoded. According to Powell, social 
evolution is the direct result of this form of competition.61 In a way, 
the GAA can be viewed as an assimilationist attempt to agitate the 
traditional modes of subsistence and ownership in tribal 
communities.62 While such a view would align with the foregoing 
theory, it would be wholly incompatible with Powell’s preference 
for the gradual and organic progress of Native societies, for 
according to Powell, “[W]e must either deal with the Indian as he is, 
looking to the slow but irresistible influence of civilization with 
which he is in contact to affect a change, or we must reduce him to 
abject slavery.”63 Given Powell’s dichotomy, he would likely have 
found the forceful means and the ideologically and culturally 
subversive aim of the GAA, when combined, to be tantamount to 
slavery. This conflict between Powell’s work and the GAA shows 
that, regardless of the anthropologist’s genuine concern for Native 
cultural identity, the federal government was only willing to adopt 
and distort ethnographic data and theories advanced by the BAE 
insofar as they reinforced the notions of Native inferiority that 
undergirded federal Indian policy or suggested an expedient route to 
assimilation.  
 A letter sent by Morgan to President Lincoln in 1862 is 
indicative of not only the conflict between what would later become 
BAE and federal Indian policy but also the connection between this 
                                                
60 Id. 
61 J. W. Powell, Competition as a Factor in Human Evolution, 1 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 297, 310 (1888). 
62 This view aligns with Henry Dawes’s argument that tribal communities are 
incapable of progressing toward civilization because selfishness is wholly 
incompatible with tribal identity. See 1885 REPORT, supra note 57, at 88. 
63 Powell, supra note 29, at 15. 
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forced transition to agriculture and slavery.64 In the letter, Morgan 
indicates that the management of Indian affairs by the federal 
government had enabled its agents to defraud Native peoples 
through the misappropriation of Indian annuities through collusions 
with licensed traders.65 Morgan writes that, in addition to these 
annuities, annual appropriations intended to fund the development 
and operation of agricultural farms were released to Indian agents.66 
Morgan then describes how $20,000 of these funds were being 
utilized on the Yankton Reservation: “The agent . . . was working 
50 Indians on [a] farm of a thousand or more acres at 50 cents each, 
per day, and intended to increase the number to 100. . . . [T]he men 
were paid in goods [from] the licensed trader.”67  This account of 
how money was managed in Indian country leaves little room for 
doubting that the federal government—knowingly, willingly, or 
ignorantly—enabled the malfeasance of Indian agents and the 
licensed traders with whom they were associated. As a solution to 
this ongoing problem, Morgan encouraged the establishment of 
Indian states where tribes could raise cattle and engage in trade on a 
national level.68  
In addition to providing a substantial means of subsistence 
for the tribes, such a solution would have enabled direct 
participation by individual Indians in the establishment and 
development of strong tribal economies. By encouraging the 
adoption of such a policy, Morgan acknowledged the skill, 
expertise, and inherent value of traditional Native horsemanship, the 
practice of which was closely tied to the cultural identities of many 
tribes, as well as the intellect and capacity for self-management of 
Native peoples.69 Compare this to the policy behind the GAA, which 
completely and utterly devalued Native traditions and tribal identity, 
forced individual Indians to work for less than what was already 
                                                
64 Lewis H. Morgan, An Unknown Letter from Lewis H. Morgan to Abraham 
Lincoln, 6 Univ. of Rochester Library Bulletin 34–40 (Paul Kosok ed., 1951) 
(1862). 
65 Morgan observed that, in many cases, “from one half to nine tenths” of the 
funds released to an Indian agent to be paid out to tribal members were 
deposited into the hands of a licensed trader (usually a near relative and always a 
partner of the agent) to settle past debts or in exchange for goods at a rate to be 
determined by the agent and trader. Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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owed to them by the federal government, and conflicted with both 
traditional and then-emerging notions of tribal sovereignty.  
Despite the fact that Morgan’s letter pre-dates the GAA by 
two decades, the implementation of the GAA indicates that 
Morgan’s criticisms continued to apply throughout the era of 
assimilation. Although individual Indians were “granted” fee title to 
their own allotments, these parcels of land were already held in 
common by each member of a tribe under its traditional notions of 
ownership. Therefore, the grant of fee title that is presumed to be the 
incentivizing element of the GAA represented little more than a 
grant of alienability, a right which could only be deemed valuable 
from a capitalist perspective wholly foreign to most allottees and 
their tribes. As the price for this “privilege” was a massive reduction 
in tribal land-holdings,70 it is evident that Native peoples were once 
again given far less than what they were already owed. While the 
federal government, under the GAA, also pledged to provide Native 
peoples with the requisite training and supplies to transition from 
tribal to agrarian ways of life, individual Indians were rarely given 
adequate financial support and were forced to live on allotments 
where they would be geographically cut off from traditional, 
familial, and communal support systems.71 In this way, the GAA 
profoundly influenced the disintegration of several key aspects of 
tribal identity and tribal self-governance. To make matters worse, 
many Indians who resisted this program of subversion were 
imprisoned.72 Collectively, these observations indicate that the 
application of the GAA led to situations similar to those described 
in Morgan’s letter to President Lincoln, situations in which the 
federal government’s control of Native assets allowed for gross 
manipulations of tribal societies and Indian labor. As this labor was 
paid out of monies held in trust on behalf of the several tribes, it is 
perhaps inappropriate to see this as genuine payment, rather the 
motivating force behind Indian agricultural labor was the 
withholding of these funds and other tribal assets in combination 
with the threat of imprisonment. As such, Powell would be correct 
                                                
70 See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 20 (University of California Press, 1997) (1995) 
(“The national Indian land estate was reduced from 138 million acres in 1887 to 
52 million acres in 1934.”). 
71 See id. 
72 Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 3, at 400 (citing Matthew Atkinson, Red 
Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American Lands, Resources, and 
People, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 394 (1998)). 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to assert that such a forceful program of assimilation was akin to 
slavery.    
While a great many legal scholars acknowledge the effects 
of this forced transition to agriculture, there are far fewer writers on 
Indian law who acknowledge how application of the GAA shaped 
the legal understanding of tribal membership.73 In 1896, the federal 
government established enrollment commissions to determine the 
legitimacy of claims of tribal membership so as to determine 
whether or not claimants were entitled to allotments under the 
GAA.74 In order to meet their objective, these commissions were to 
evaluate blood quantum, compel witnesses, and collect other 
evidence to establish official rolls for the several tribes over the 
course of six months.75 As a result of the lack of tribal involvement 
and this time constraint, the commissions produced rolls, excluding 
members and including non-members of tribes, that memorialized 
their inability to properly evaluate tribal membership.76 In spite of 
these errors, the authority of these official rolls, the importance of 
blood quantum in determining tribal membership, and the unilateral 
authority of Congress to determine tribal membership would be 
continually reaffirmed by the courts.77 Although they clearly 
conflict with traditional notions of tribal identity based on non-
familial kinship and shared activity, these aspects of assimilationist 
policy would be reaffirmed by the act intended to put an end to the 
federal government’s program of assimilation, and they continue to 
exist within both tribal and federal Indian law to this day. 
The assimilationist aim as adopted by the BIA also led to the 
restructuring and centralization of tribal governments. During the 
implementation of the GAA, agents of the BIA “ignore[d] existing 
legitimate Native governments in favor of new governments 
organized on its initiative, because the latter were more amenable to 
                                                
73 See FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW at § 
3.03[4] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) (indicating that the establishment of 
official rolls was primarily influenced by the process of allotment). 
74 Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 3, at 400. 
75 Id. at 400–01.  
76 Id. at 401 (citing Angelique A. EagleWoman & Wambdi A. Wastewin, Tribal 
Values of Taxation Within the Tribalist Economic Theory, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y, 1, 7 (2008)).  
77 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 955 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(recognizing that the Seminole Nation continues to base tribal enrollment on the 
Dawes Rolls); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 (1899) (holding 
that Congress had the authority to establish commissions to determine who was 
entitled to citizenship in the several tribes). 
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Bureau desires.”78 In the 1920s, this policy led to the BIA creating 
the Navajo Tribal Council in order to facilitate the leasing of tribal 
lands for the sake of oil exploration and development by the federal 
government; the current government of the Navajo Nation evolved 
out of this act.79 The BIA also made similar unsuccessful attempts 
to restructure/replace the All-Pueblo Council and the tribal council 
on the Flathead Reservation.80 In each of these cases and others, the 
BIA attempted to shift the political power of tribal organizations 
from communities committed to traditional values to groups of 
individuals who were willing to cooperate with the capitalist aims 
of the federal government. While the policy behind this trend might 
not have persisted, the transition into the next era of federal Indian 
policy would occur at a time when the BIA was actively engaged in 
disrupting, dismantling, and redefining the distribution of tribal 
political power. 
 
C.   The Indian Reorganization Act 
 
 Much of the current legal interpretation concerning tribal 
identity as it pertains to enrollment and tribal sovereignty results 
from policy decisions related to and the enactment of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).81 While one may be critical of a 
portion of the effects of the IRA or its implementation, it is far more 
difficult to find fault with its purpose. In proposing the bill to 
Congress, John Collier, then Commissioner for the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, stated that the IRA was intended to grant Indian tribes the 
“freedom to organize for the purposes of local self-government and 
economic enterprise [so that they might achieve] civil liberty, 
political responsibility, and economic independence.”82 The IRA 
was also meant to address issues presented by the Meriam Report,83 
which was a general study of the living conditions in Native 
                                                
78 Elmer Rusco, The Indian Reorganization Act and Indian Self-Government, in 
AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE BUILDING OF NATIVE 
NATIONS 49, 51 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 52. 
81 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2012). 
82 H.R. 7902, 73rd Congress, (2nd Sess. 1934) [hereinafter IRA Proposal]. 
83 See THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND BILLS xi (Vine 
Deloria ed., Univ. of Oklahoma Press 2002). 
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communities.84 The report indicated that the totality of the living 
conditions to be found in most of these communities was conducive 
to the development of poor health and the spread of disease;85 also 
noted in the report was the federal government’s complete and utter 
failure to aid in the acclimation of Native peoples to the conditions 
produced by allotment, establish and administer educational and 
healthcare services, and provide Native peoples with adequate legal 
protections.86  The means Collier identified to serve these ends were 
the repeal of assimilationist policies—which was to be facilitated in 
part by the federal government turning over control of various assets 
and programs to the tribes they were meant to serve—and the 
establishment and recognition of strong tribal governments with 
written constitutions.87  
 In the years that followed the enactment of the IRA, Indians, 
anthropologists, and policymakers would debate over what should 
serve as the basis for the form of the soon-to-be-established tribal 
governments. Loretta Fowler indicates that, after the development 
of theories concerning the process of acculturation in the 1920s, 
many anthropologists categorized Native representatives as being 
either conservative (resistant to the idea of western government) or 
progressive (open to the idea of political reorganization under the 
BIA).88 Felix Cohen, an attorney who greatly influenced the 
establishment of tribal constitutions, indicated that a similar debate 
was taking place between anthropologists and BIA administrators 
when he wrote the following: 
 
The word anthropology is a red flag to the regular 
Indian Service Administrator. To him, it generally 
connotes a breed of people that look upon Indians as 
museum exhibits to be measured and cataloged, 
rather than as human beings faced with the universal 
human problems of earning a living, keeping healthy, 
raising a family, getting along with neighbors, and 
enjoying life.89 
                                                
84 LEWIS MERIAM ET AL, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION vii (The 
John Hopkins Press 1928). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 8–20. 
87 IRA Proposal, supra note 82. 
88 Fowler, supra note 6, at 73–74. 
89 Felix S. Cohen, Anthropology and the Problems of Indian Administration, 18 
THE SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 171 (1937). 
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This stereotypified perspective disregards the profound and 
deleterious effect that assimilationist policies had on Native peoples 
and their living conditions. To take Native peoples as they were at 
the time that the IRA was being drafted and implemented as the sole 
focus of progressive policy reform, particularly from a non-Indian 
perspective, would entail the dismissal of those traditional practices 
and perspectives that were disrupted by the process of assimilation, 
for while these aspects of Native culture could persist in the hearts, 
minds, or souls of Native peoples, they were not allowed to persist 
as a facet of Native activity. Even for Cohen, a progressive who 
arguably evaded other stereotypes, the value of historical 
anthropology was in its ability to aid in the implementation of 
policies adopted by politicians.90 
 Although the IRA may have been aimed at establishing a 
foundation upon which traditional notions of tribal sovereignty 
could be asserted, the devaluation of historical anthropology 
frustrated this purpose. Shortly after the IRA was enacted, Cohen 
drafted an opinion issued by the Department of the Interior on the 
behalf of Solicitor Nathan R. Margold concerning the “Powers of 
Indian Tribes” (Opinion),91 which explained that tribal powers were 
internally defined: 
 
In point of form it is immaterial whether the powers 
of an Indian tribe are expressed and exercised 
through customs handed down by word of mouth or 
through written constitutions and statutes. In either 
case the laws of the Indian tribe owe their force to the 
will of the members of the tribe.92 
 
This language served as the basis for the subsequent assertion that 
“an Indian tribe must, if it has any power at all, have the power to 
prescribe the forms through which its will may be registered.”93 
                                                
90 See generally id. at 171–80 (providing several examples of how historical 
anthropology could aid in the implementation of federal policy regardless of 
whether it promoted the preservation or the destruction of tribal identity). 
91 Rusco, supra note 78, at 55. 
92 Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solic. Gen. 445, 448 (1934) [hereinafter 
Powers]. 
93 Id. at 455. 
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However, as was to be expected, any particular powers described in 
the opinion are illustrated by way of federal caselaw.94  
This reliance on federal caselaw presented a distorted view 
of what tribal sovereignty meant for many tribes. While pre-1920s 
caselaw may have emphasized a tribe’s political authority,95 very 
few, if any, judicial opinions of the era illustrated particular 
manifestations of this authority or the route by which it is derived 
from the will of tribal members. Furthermore, caselaw that 
exemplified the exercise of tribal self-governance was wrought with 
the anthropological shortcomings of the prior era.96 Even at its best, 
such caselaw only represented those rights that were both asserted 
by tribes sufficiently acquainted with American jurisprudence and 
recognized as valid by the courts.  As a result, the Opinion would 
conclude with an espousal of inherent tribal powers that were overly 
generalized and could—at least in part—be described as the 
hallmarks European governmental forms.97 According to the 
Opinion, these powers were “subject to modification,” not in light 
of distinct traditions, but “with respect to particular tribes in the light 
of particular powers granted, or particular restrictions imposed, by 
special treaties or by special legislation.”98 These externally defined 
powers would serve as the defining features of a fictional, shared 
political identity of tribes that are—and have always been—
distinguished by unique and vibrant cultures and customs that were, 
in this Opinion, largely disregarded. 
                                                
94 E.g., Waldron v. U.S., 143 Fed. 413 (1905) (affirming the right of a tribe to 
accept as members those who do not meet a federally, rather than tribally, 
established criteria), cited in Powers, supra note 92, at 457; Ex parte Crow Dog, 
109 U.S. 556 (1883) (holding that murder committed by one Indian against 
another Indian must be dealt with according to tribal law), cited in Powers, 
supra note 92, at 472–73. 
95 E.g., Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation and U.S., 28 Ct. Cls. 281, 317–18 
(recognizing the civility of the Cherokee Nation and its right to refuse per capita 
payments to newly adopted members of the Delaware Indians after establishing 
a rule of distribution based on Cherokee blood quantum), citied in Powers, supra 
note 92, at 452–53. 
96 E.g., id. (“[The Cherokee Constitution] was framed and adopted by a people 
some of whom were still in the savage state, and the better portion of whom had 
just entered upon that stage of civilization which is characterized by industrial 
pursuits.”) 
97 In short, these powers were defined in the Opinion as follows: the powers to 
(1) adopt a form of a government, (2) to define tribal membership, (3) to 
regulate domestic relations, (4) to prescribe rules of inheritance, (5) to levy dues, 
fees, or taxes, (6) to exclude non-members, (7) to regulate property under tribal 
jurisdiction, (8) to establish and administer a system of justice, and (9) to impose 
limited regulations on federal employees. Powers, supra note 92, at 476–77. 
98 Id. at 37. 
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 Roughly one month after Cohen drafted the Opinion, he 
would write a memorandum “On the Drafting of Tribal 
Constitutions” (Memorandum), which would “offer useful 
suggestions to Indians engaged in drawing up constitutions for 
adoption and approval under the [IRA] and to members of the Indian 
Service who may be called upon to assist in this task.”99 This lengthy 
document, which provided examples of previously drafted tribal 
constitutional provisions that were idealized by Cohen, and a model 
constitution drafted in-part by Cohen would serve as templates for 
those tribes that had not committed the blueprint for their political 
identities to writing.  
One section of the Memorandum entitled “Offices and 
Titles” was provided to help tribes and BIA employees decide 
whether they would “choose between the older forms of tribal 
government and the forms of government that are customary in 
white communities.”100 While Cohen claimed that many of the 
“ancient traditions of [tribal] self-government . . . [had] been 
forgotten,” he did state that these traditions “offer[ed] a very 
important source of knowledge and wisdom to those who are 
engaged in drafting a constitution.”101 However, the inherent value 
of these traditions was to be found in the fact that “each Indian tribe 
had its own governing officers, its own policemen if policemen were 
necessary, its own system of land holding and inheritance, its own 
laws of marriage and divorce, and its own code of crimes.”102 In this 
way, Cohen recognized the value of tradition only insofar as it 
served the practical ends of the federal government as set forth in 
the IRA and only insofar as it concerned aspects of government that 
had European analogues. Even when these traditions could serve the 
practical purpose of informing the organization of a tribal 
government, Cohen cautioned that while “old methods” would 
likely prove satisfactory “on those reservations which have never 
been allotted, where the Indian community is strong, and where the 
difficult problems of contacts between individual Indians and 
individual white men seldom arise,” they could be “entirely 
                                                
99 FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS 3 (David E. 
Wilkins ed., 2006). 
100 Id. at 19. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. It is important to recognize that the powers of government here alluded to 
were precisely those that were outlawed, and thereby diminished, by the Code of 
Indian Offenses. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
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inapplicable” in regions “where white men have entered in large 
numbers and where most of the Indians’ troubles arise out of the 
activities of whites”;103 as the BIA’s implementation of the IRA—
including the aid it provided in the tribal constitutional drafting 
process—strongly suggests that the situation of many if not all tribes 
fit the latter description, this could be seen as a thinly veiled 
argument that tribes organizing under the IRA should adopt new 
forms of government. The ideal form of government described by 
Cohen in his Memorandum104 and his model constitution was a 
representative democracy.105 
In addition to describing the form of government to be 
adopted by the tribes, Cohen also included exemplary provisions 
concerning tribal membership in the Memorandum. These 
provisions defined membership in terms of one’s inclusion on tribal 
rolls (as prepared by the BIA), blood quantum, the status of one’s 
parents, one’s residence, and tribal adoption practices.106 While 
these examples were used suggestively, they were coupled with the 
Secretary’s urging tribes to adopt regulations—including positive 
limits on the automatic adoption of the children of genuine 
members107—because “it was paramount to their tribal welfare to 
weed out those Indians seeking membership who possessed a low 
blood quantum.”108 Furthermore, the definition of “Indian” provided 
in the IRA excluded those Indians possessing less than one-half 
blood quantum that were not directly descended from members 
enrolled in federally recognized tribes and living on a reservation on 
June 1, 1934.109 Instead of defining tribal membership in terms of 
inclusion based on kinship, Cohen and those at the BIA encouraged 
tribes to define tribal membership in terms of exclusion based 
                                                
103 COHEN, supra note 99, at 19. 
104 Id. at 20 (focusing on the idea of tribal councils composed of officers each 
having authority delegated by the tribe).   
105 Id. at 173–75. 
106 Id. at 13–18. 
107 Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for 
Indian Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 447 (“[T]he Secretary [concluded] that 
the Departments policy should be ‘to urge and insist that any constitutional 
provision conferring automatic tribal membership upon children hereafter born, 
should limit such membership to persons who reasonably can be expected to 
participate in tribal relations and affairs.’”) (quoting Circular No. 3123, United 
States Dept. of Interior (Nov. 18, 1935) (on file with Carole Goldberg)). 
108 Id. at 446 (quoting Circular No. 3123, supra note 107). 
109 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012). 
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primarily on blood quanta and documentation prepared by non-
Indians. 
 While it has been suggested by Elmer Rusco and others that 
a model constitution was never provided to tribes organizing under 
the IRA,110 David Wilkins subsequently found both the model 
constitution drafted in-part by Cohen and evidence that it was 
distributed to those BIA employees that would aid in the drafting of 
tribal constitutions.111 Comparison of this model with those 
constitutions drafted immediately after the enactment of the IRA 
strongly indicates that BIA employees to whom this model was 
distributed had a profound influence on the drafting process. Several 
tribes drafting constitutions during the 1930s adopted most of the 
boilerplate language of the model form with minimal deviations.112 
To these more formulaic constitutions, many of the adopting tribes 
added membership provisions (for the most part concerning blood 
quanta) as suggested in the Memorandum,113 a section concerning 
vacancies and removals from tribal offices,114 and a section 
concerning land rights.115 To a lesser extent, some of these tribes 
included a bill of rights possessed by tribal members.116  By and 
large, these additional sections aimed at preserving those rights that 
were threatened under the administration of the previous era share 
                                                
110 See generally Elmer Rusco, The Indian Reorganization Act and Indian Self-
Government, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE 
REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 49 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006).  
111 David E. Wilkins, introduction to FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF 
TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS xi, xxvii (David E. Wilkins ed., 2006). 
112 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS FOR THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE 
BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION (1936); CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE 
NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE OF THE TONGUE RIVER RESERVATION (1935); 
CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE KEWEENAW BAY INDIAN COMMUNITY 
MICHIGAN (1937); see also, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE LUMMI TRIBE 
OF THE LUMMI RESERVATION, WASHINGTON (1957). 
113 E.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE Art. 
II, § 1 (1935) (requiring the children of nonresident members to have one-half or 
more degree of Indian blood and three years of residence on the reservation to 
qualify for automatic adoption); CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE FORT 
BELKNAP COMMUNITY OF THE FORT BELKNAP RESERVATION OF MONTANA Art. 
I, §§ 2–4 (1935) (requiring one-fourth and one-eighth degree of Indian blood to 
qualify for automatic membership and adoption respectively but also 
recognizing that membership shall not be lost other than by formal request or 
moving to a foreign country). 
114 E.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND 
KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION MONTANA Art. V (1935).  
115 E.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE APACHE TRIBE OF THE MESCALERO 
RESERVATION NEW MEXICO art. VII (1936). 
116 E.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE MAKAH INDIAN TRIBE OF THE 
MAKAH INDIAN RESERVATION Art. VII (1936). 
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identical language,117 which suggests that these sections were either 
drafted with or disseminated to the tribes by BIA employees. 
Although some tribes had previously established their own 
constitutions—many of which were found by Cohen to be in some 
way exemplary118—all tribes drafting IRA constitutions were 
required to have their drafts approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior.119 Those constitutions that were approved indicated that a 
tribe’s authority would continue to be restricted by a similar 
approval requirement.120 For example, the Oglala Sioux of the Pine 
Ridge Reservation adopted multiple constitutions prior to the 
enactment of the IRA.121 In drafting the Tribe’s first  constitution, 
the Oglala Sioux outlined a form of tribal government that would 
maintain their cultural heritage by encouraging broad strokes 
political participation—through the Oglala Tribal Council, a large 
body of delegates representing the eight districts of the 
reservation—and preserving the role of an elected chief.122 
                                                
117 For example, the sections of the Blackfeet constitution and the Grand Ronde 
constitution concerning land rights are nearly identical, having only one entirely 
unique section between them and most other sections differing only in terms of 
self-reference. Compare CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS FOR THE BLACKFEET 
TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION OF MONTANA Art. VII (1935), 
with CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS FOR THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE 
GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OREGON Art. IX (1936). 
118 In particular, Cohen makes use of the pre-IRA Pine Ridge Constitution to 
illustrate how tribes should formally recognize treaty rights and their articles of 
incorporation to illustrate how to recognize the power of tribal members to elect 
and modify the authority of tribal officers by popular vote. COHEN, supra note 
99, at 7, 37, 45, 65. 
119 It is important to note that the IRA did not grant to the tribes a right to 
organize under a constitution to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior; in 
fact, the IRA itself contains formal recognition of an inherent aspect of tribal 
sovereignty: the right of tribes to organize according to their own principles. 25 
U.S.C. § 5123(h) (2012). However, it is also important to consider the situation 
created by the IRA: For the first time, the federal government agreed to 
recognize tribal self-government as it was identified by the tribes. It is 
reasonable to believe that Native peoples may have believed that this degree of 
acceptance was conditioned upon approval. Such a belief is somewhat justified 
by the language of 25 U.S.C. § 5123(a) (2012), which indicates that IRA 
constitutions would only become effective when “ratified by a majority vote of 
[adult tribal members]” and “approved by the Secretary.” 
120 Generally, IRA constitutions featured provisions requiring secretarial 
approval before those documents could be amended. E.g. CONSTITUTION AND 
BY-LAWS OF THE ALABAMA COUSHATTA TRIBES OF TEXAS Art. IX (1938) 
(“[N]o amendment shall become effective until it shall have been ap roved [sic] 
by the Secretary of the Interior.”).  
121 See Richmond L. Clow, The Indian Reorganization Act and the Loss of 
Tribal Sovereignty: Constitutions on the Rosebud and Pine Ridge Reservations, 
7 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY 125 (1987).  
122 Id. at 127. 
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Following the adoption of this constitution, the Superintendent of 
the Pine Ridge Reservation, Ernest W. Jermark—who complained 
that the newly formed council failed to be of any material benefit to 
him—encouraged the Tribe to adopt amendments that would both 
greatly reduce the size of the tribal council and require written 
approval from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs before any future 
constitutional amendments could be made.123 This revised and 
amended constitution was accepted by the Tribe in 1928.124  
Between 1928 and 1935, the evolution of the Oglala Sioux 
constitution is a microcosmic example of the transition from tribal 
governments rooted in communal sovereignty to tribal 
representative democracies managed by the Department of the 
Interior. At the direction of Jermark, the Tribe elected its first 
council under the 1928 constitution, which reduced the number 
tribal representatives from eighty to twenty-one.125 Many were 
displeased by this drastic change, and the reservations became 
severely factionalized, which resulted in various forms of political 
dissidence including the creation of an extralegal government.126 By 
1933, the tribe had adopted a new constitution that settled the series 
of conflicts that arose out of this political divide by doing away with 
the commissioner approval requirement of the last constitution and 
recognizing that each member of the Tribe had a right to vote; 
however, this new constitution also established a tribal council that 
had complete management authority regarding any business that 
came before the Tribe.127  In 1934, after the enactment of the IRA, 
the requirement for commissioner approval was replaced with 
review requirements for three categories of tribal legislative action: 
(1) no review was required for those actions that pertained only to 
tribal operations or tribal official procedure; (2) certain actions, 
including but not limited to the alteration of voting districts and 
hiring legal counsel, required secretarial approval; and (3) decisions 
related to tribal funding and property required approval by the 
reservation superintendent.128 
 By encouraging tribes to formally adopt representative 
democracies, the BIA diminished the authority of the general 
                                                
123 Id. at 128.  
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126 Id. at 128–29. 
127 Id. at 129. 
128 Id. at 130–32. 
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membership. Even though many tribal constitutions mirroring 
Cohen’s model that were adopted by tribes under the IRA 
recognized that the primary governing body was the General Tribal 
Council (all members qualified to vote),129 IRA constitutions 
formally recognized a process by which the totality of the authority 
of a tribe—aside from the right to review and vote on official 
decisions—would be vested in approximately five tribal officials.130 
This authority once vested under an IRA constitution would then be 
subject to limitations imposed by the Secretary or the superintendent 
of a reservation, which, by extension, further restricted the authority 
of the membership as a whole.131 By making such a constitution the 
supreme law of the land on a particular reservation, a tribal drafters 
represented, at least externally, that that the tribe as a whole acted 
through its officials and not its members. In the context of 
disenrollment, this representation is made internally as well, for 
through the act of disenrollment, the identity of the tribe is wholly 
conflated with that of its officials. This situation resulted not from 
the federal government’s acceptance or recognition of tribal custom 
or tradition but from a process beginning with discovery by which 
Native cultures were scrutinized, criticized, and—to a certain 
extent—diminished. While a tribe organized under the IRA may be 
healthy and fully functioning, officials seeking to unjustly excise 
tribal members may capitalize on the fact that they are clothed in the 
protections inherent to the authority that tribal sovereignty confers 
whereas potential disenrollees are not. 
 Given anthropological accounts concerning the connection 
between kinship and tribal identity and tribal governance based on 
consensus,132 the federal government’s imposition of representative 
forms of government—under which major decisions would be 
decided by quorums of enrolled voters, a separate and distinct 
executive body, and the Secretary—drastically altered the 
ideological foundations of those societies that had not made these 
decisions on their own.133 However, Cohen did recognize that tribal 
                                                
129 See COHEN, supra note 99, at 174. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. at 174–76. 
132 See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. 
133 There were, however, tribes that chose to adopt such democratic forms of 
government. For example, Cohen observed that “[p]olitically, there was nothing 
in the kingdoms and empires of Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth  
centuries to parallel the democratic constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy, 
with its provisions for initiative, referendum, and recall, and its suffrage for 
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officials were direct representatives of the combined will of tribal 
members, even going so far as to quote a Fort Belknap elder in 
saying that “[t]hey are merely the Voice or Interpreter of the wishes 
of the people.”134 It is presumably for this reason that Cohen’s model 
constitution recognized that the General Tribal Council was the 
governing body of the tribe, but the model constitution only 
described two powers that would clearly be directly exercised by 
such a council: (1) the power to vote in the election of tribal officials 
and (2) the right to call special meetings to review official 
decisions.135 In addition to these powers, the IRA provides that 
constitutional adoption and amendment requires a majority vote of 
the General Tribal Council.136 While these powers are limited, 
Cohen, in his model constitution, recognized that a General Tribal 
Council could have further powers delegated to it by the members 
of its tribe or the federal government and that the reserved, inherent 
powers of a tribe—at least insofar as they were not previously 
limited by acts of Congress—could be exercised by the General 
Tribal Council through the adoption of bylaws and constitutional 
amendments.137 While these powers—even when fully exercised—
are unlikely to lead to a complete unification of the will of tribal 
members with the actions of its officials, they are perhaps the surest 
means by which the members of a tribe may collectively exercise 
their sovereign authority. As such, these powers, which could 
potentially check the unjust actions of tribal officials, when utilized 
effectively, may collectively be used as a tool to fight unjust 
disenrollment. 
 
III.   THE TRIBAL FRANCHISE AND DISENROLLMENT 
 
 Disenrollment—a term which has no meaning or equivalent 
in any Native tongue,138 a term which had no special legal meaning 
prior to the 1930s139—is the act by which the representatives of a 
                                                
women as well as men.” Felix S. Cohen, Americanizing the White Man, in THE 
LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 315, 319 (Lucy 
Kramer Cohen Ed., 1960). 
134 COHEN, supra note 99, at 51. 
135 Id. at 174. 
136 25 U.S.C. § 5123(a)(1) (2012). 
137 COHEN, supra note 99, at 175. 
138 Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 3, at 385. 
139 David E. Wilkins, Exiling One’s Kin: Banishment and Disenrollment in 
Indian Country, 17 W. LEGAL HIST. 235, 239 (2004). 
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tribe may deny quintessential aspect of the identities of tribal 
members: their connections with the lands of their ancestors, their 
rights and benefits as recognized in treaties and other agreements 
with the federal government, and their abilities to identify with the 
whole of their shared tribal community.140 Regardless of any 
potential merits behind such an action, the disenrollment of genuine 
tribal members causes bilateral harm: By disenrolling such a 
member, the representatives of a tribe erode—in a purely legal 
sense—the genuine connections between that member and his or her 
tribe, and in doing so, they fray the bonds between the tribe and its 
past, present, and future members.141 At its best, disenrollment 
serves to remedy errors on universally inaccurate tribal rolls 
prepared by non-Indians142 concerned with invalidating or settling 
en masse the claims of those Indians that their government had 
disenfranchised.143 At its worst disenrollment is motivated by the 
prospect of the economic gains that would result from thinning out 
tribal membership when a tribe has instituted per capita distributions 
of tribal revenues.144 To argue against these forms of disenrollment 
is not to attack the tribal sovereignty that serves as the basis for these 
actions, it is to argue on the behalf of the tribal membership that is 
and has always been the source of sovereign authority, that is 
collectively the tribe in itself, and whose sovereign rights and 
internal cohesion is denied by the act of disenrollment. 
 
A.   Tribal Sovereignty and Justifications for Disenrollment 
 
 Many eloquent proponents of disenrollment claim that it 
may be justified as a traditional practice or right of Native peoples; 
this claim is appealing but unfounded. Advocates for disenrollment 
cite both Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as 
authorities affirming such a right. However, neither of these 
authorities explicitly approve the practice of disenrollment, and both 
authorities rest on the assertion that “Indian tribes are ‘distinct, 
                                                
140 Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 3, at 392. 
141 Id. at 391 nn.31–32. 
142 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 4 CCAR 4, 1997 WL 
34719458 (Colville C.A. May 5, 1997) (discussing the inaccuracies of the rolls 
prepared for tribes). 
143 See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
144 See discussion infra Part III.E. 
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independent political communities, retaining their original natural 
rights’ in matters of local self-government.”145 As disenrollment 
was not a traditional practice of Native peoples,146 in order for it to 
be considered to be or result from a natural right of a tribe, it must 
be approved collectively by its membership or else it will not be an 
expression of its sovereignty. 
 
1.   Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 
 
 Martinez centered around a controversy arising in 
connection with a provision of the Santa Clara Pueblo constitution 
stating that tribal membership would be denied to the children of a 
mother of the Pueblo and a nonmember father.147 Because there was 
no similar rule that would apply to the children of a Santa Claran 
father, the respondent, Julia Martinez, originally brought an action 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of 
this provision that would deny membership to her children.148 In 
doing so, Martinez asserted that, under Title I of ICRA,149 the 
ordinance violated her right to equal protection under the laws of the 
tribe.150 The Court—after accepting that suit could be brought 
against a Tribal officer151—rejected the notion that such a cause of 
action was available to Martinez in federal court for three reasons: 
(1) while ICRA was enacted to preserve the rights of tribal members 
against the overreach of tribal governments,  the legislative history 
of the Act shows that it was intended to promote “the policy of 
furthering Indian self-government”;152 (2) a writ of habeas corpus is 
the only form of relief available under ICRA;153 and (3) only 
Congress, rather than the federal judiciary, has the authority to 
review tribal legislation.154 
 Invoking Martinez to justify disenrollment actions is 
problematic for several reasons. Facially, the controversy in 
                                                
145 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (quoting Worcester 
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Martinez and disenrollment challenges are clearly non-analogous. 
Further, to apply the argument supporting the Court’s decision in 
Martinez in the context of disenrollment would lead to logical 
inconsistency. The fundamental basis of the Martinez opinion was 
expressed by the lower court as follows: 
 
If [tribal sovereignty has] any meaning at all, [it] 
must mean that a tribe can make and enforce its 
decisions without regard to whether an external 
authority considers those decision wise. To abrogate 
tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate area of 
membership, for whatever ‘good’ reasons, is to 
destroy cultural identity under the guise of saving it. 
Congress has not indicated that it intended [ICRA] to 
be interpreted in such a manner.155 
 
Shackling such a foundation to an argument in support of 
disenrollment would be nothing short of argumentative contortion. 
While it is true that the federal judiciary should not intervene in 
tribal governance or legislation, the argument that disenrollment 
imperils the identity of tribes and that it only exists because that 
identity has been externally manipulated and obfuscated is both 
undeniable and axiomatic. Every aspect of a tribe’s identity exists 
and has existed in some way through its membership and, therefore, 
to extinguish tribal membership, or the connections that serve as its 
foundation, is to extinguish tribal identity. Because there is no 
indication that disenrollment is in any way linked to Native 
culture,156 it is entirely unclear what aspect of Native identity would 
be preserved by its continued and unrestrained practice. 
  The pro-disenrollment argument is also severely hampered 
by the fact that the Santa Claran constitution differs significantly 
from those mirroring Cohen’s model. The Martinez opinion also 
rests on the Court’s recognition that Indian tribes “retain[] their 
original natural rights,”157 including their power to “regulat[e] their 
                                                
155 Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18–19 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd, 
540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 56 L. Ed. 2d 
106 (1978), quoted in Martinez, 436 U.S. at 54. 
156 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
157 Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 
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internal and social relations.”158 When Cohen wrote his model 
constitution, he indicated that for each tribe these powers rested in a 
“General Tribal Council . . . composed of all the qualified voters of 
the [tribe].”159 Cohen’s model is also that of an enumerated powers 
constitution, in that it indicates that those powers not explicitly 
vested in the officers of a tribe remain in the hands of the people.160 
Unlike many of the tribal constitutions adopted in the 1930s—which 
happen to closely follow Cohen’s model161—the 1935 Santa Claran 
constitution does not explicitly indicate that the governing body of 
the tribe is a General Tribal Counsel. Instead, the Pueblo adopted 
provisions indicating that the entirety of its governing power shall 
be vested in a pueblo counsel composed of the organization’s 
officers.162 And, while the Santa Claran constitution features a 
section concerning its future amendment and a “general pueblo” 
approval requirement, that section deviates from Cohen’s model and 
is arguably legally ambiguous and, therefore, open to the 
interpretation of the pueblo counsel.163 Furthermore, the provision 
challenged in Martinez is in direct conflict with the provision it 
replaced, which states that “[t]he membership of the [Pueblo] shall 
consist [in part of] . . . [a]ll children of mixed marriages between 
members of the Santa Clara pueblo and nonmembers, provided such 
children have been recognized and adopted by the council.”164 On 
account of these deviations from constitutional norms, it may be 
inappropriate to apply the ruling in Martinez to disenrollment 
challenges concerning any tribe whose membership retains a greater 
degree of authority, particularly when those tribes have not adopted 
constitutional provisions that justify the disenrollment of a 
petitioner. Because restricting or prohibiting federal judicial review 
of tribal legislation and its enforcement may be necessary to prevent 
a degree of interference that would diminish tribal sovereignty, it is 
still important that this brand of review is left to tribal courts. 
However, those courts need to operate independently of the other 
branches of tribal government in order to ensure that the rights of 
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tribal members are preserved,165 and—more importantly—the legal 
community cannot operate under the assumption that the judicial 
restrictions in Martinez apply to tribal courts.  
 
2.   United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 
 
 UNDRIP is a document that was drafted and adopted by the 
United Nations in 2007 to officially recognize the rights of 
indigenous peoples across the globe.166 Although the United States 
initially voted against the adoption of UNDRIP, President Obama 
formally adopted the Declaration in 2010.167 While the adoption is 
not legally binding on the federal government,168 many tribal 
advocates believe that UNDRIP has been and will continue to be a 
positive force in federal Indian law and policy reform.169 Because 
the policy considerations recognized in UNDRIP ought to be 
preserved and respected, it is important to understand how 
proponents and opponents of disenrollment may utilize the 
Declaration as a basis for their respective arguments. 
 While many of the articles contained in UNDRIP have some 
bearing on the problem of unjust disenrollment, the only article that 
directly relates to issues pertaining to membership is UNDRIP 
Article 33, which states the following: (1) “Indigenous peoples have 
the right to determine their own identity or membership in 
accordance with their customs and traditions,” and (2) “[i]ndigenous 
peoples have the right to determine the structures and select the 
membership of their institutions in accordance with their own 
procedures.”170 At first blush, this language seems to wholly support 
the notion that a tribe may determine its membership as it sees fit, 
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which would clearly appeal to a proponent of disenrollment. 
However, a deeper analysis of the Article indicates that its drafters 
were not advocating for a process by which a tribal government 
could arbitrarily revoke the tribal identities of indigenous persons.  
If we as tribal advocates wish UNDRIP to be legally binding, 
we ought to interpret it in light of the canons of statutory 
interpretation. In particular, “effect must be given to all the words 
of the [Article] . . . so that none will be void, superfluous, or 
redundant.”171 Applying this rule, we are necessarily led to the 
conclusion that the determination of the identity or membership of 
indigenous peoples referred to in (1) must be distinguished from the 
selection of members of indigenous peoples’ institutions referred to 
in (2). The plain language of these sections indicates that the former 
concerns tribal membership whereas the latter concerns the election 
and/or appointment of tribal officials. In either case, Article 33 
concerns actions to be taken by indigenous peoples rather than a 
discrete and centralized tribal government, and in the case of 
determining tribal membership, those actions must be taken in 
accordance with custom and tradition.  
Given the above interpretation of Article 33, the issues 
become whether there are tribal traditions or customs that justify 
disenrollment. David E. Wilkins, who has extensively studied the 
history and litigation surrounding disenrollment, indicates that 
while American Indians did practice banishment or exile, the word 
“disenrollment” is a legal term that did not appear until the 1930s.172 
Further, Wilkins writes that accounts of and ordinances concerning 
early exclusion practices indicate that banishment was only used to 
address what tribes traditionally considered serious crimes—e.g. 
murder, failure to contribute ones labor to the community, and 
incest— unless the person facing banishment was an adopted 
member of an alien nation.173 Gabe Galanda, a staunch legal 
advocate for those facing disenrollment, further explains that tribal 
membership was traditionally based on “kinship and belonging at 
birth” and that membership criteria that deviate from the rule of 
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kinship were forced upon tribes organizing under the Indian 
Reorganization Act in the 1930s.174 In Galanda’s own words:  
 
Under the IRA, family members became political 
members of tribal constitutional governments and 
corporate entities, particularly under boilerplate 
constitutions and corporate charters foisted upon 
tribes by John Collier and his followers, including a 
nascent National Congress of American Indians. 
Under those new tribal laws, tribal relatives can be 
“disenrolled” from the tribe.175 	 
	 
The words of Wilkins and Galanda indicate that UNDRIP does not 
provide any justification for depriving indigenous persons of the 
benefits of their tribal identities as the justifications for and the act 
of disenrollment have no basis in the customs or traditions of Native 
peoples.  
Arguably, UNDRIP presents a floor and not a ceiling for 
how we ought to interpret the rights of tribal organizations, and 
Martinez raises this floor by affirming the right of tribes to 
determine their identities and membership requirements without the 
need for traditional or customary justification. This is incredibly 
important because tribal identities have been manipulated and tribal 
traditions and customs have been obscured by acts of Congress and 
the federal agencies formed to assist in tribal governmental 
development. However, it is even more important to recognize that 
these manipulations of the federal government have shaped external 
perspectives of tribal identity to the point that “the tribe” and “tribal 
rights” are seen as being ontologically divorced from tribal 
membership, but this is entirely antithetical to most, if not all, 
conceptions of tribal sovereignty. For a great many tribes—
including some of those that have engaged in the disenrollment of 
genuine tribal members—the tribe is one and the same with its 
membership.176 As such, the rights of a tribe belong to and are to be 
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exercised by its members. In light of tribal governmental changes 
during the 1930s, directly exercising the right to define tribal 
membership would require the membership to draft and adopt its 
own relevant constitutional provisions, whereas indirect exercise of 
this right would at least require that such provisions or disenrollment 
actions be ratified by a majority vote of all qualified members.177 
Either way, constitutional articles formally recognizing the voting 
rights of tribal members must be ironclad and protections 
concerning these rights must be robust in order to ensure that the 
rights of a tribe are honored and respected. 
The importance of the tribal franchise may be clearly 
illustrated by the factual backdrops of several recent disenrollment 
cases. In particular, these cases demonstrate how several forms of 
disenfranchisement have allowed officials and/or tribal minority 
factions to invalidate aspects of their tribal identities to profit both 
politically and economically. The factual backdrop of these cases is 
of supreme importance because the best way to prevent unjust 
disenrollment is to prevent such an action from ever being initiated. 
In a great many cases, a more complete understanding and 
appreciation of the scope of tribal authority and constitutional 
protections on the parts of tribal members, tribal officials, and the 
greater legal community may forestall the tragedy that is associated 
with disenrollment. 
 
B.   Elem Indian Colony and the Disenfranchisement of 
Potential Disenrollees 
 
On March 30, 2016, the sixty-one adult members of Elem 
Indian Colony of Pomo Indians were served with orders of 
disenrollment informing them that all of the members living on the 
Clear Lake reservation, including seventy-one children, were being 
simultaneously disenrolled from the tribe and banished from its 
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lands.178 For the time being, the potential disenrollees are also being 
denied rights to both voting and health services.179 The Elem Tribal 
Council, whose members reside in the San Francisco Bay Area,180 
justified this action by way of reference to a conflict concerning its 
2014 tribal election.181 Those facing disenrollment claim that each 
of the adults residing on the reservation at the time, sixty of the 121 
members on the then-current membership roll, were denied access 
to the election venue.182 Having been denied the ability to vote at the 
“official election,” the allegedly ousted members decided to hold an 
election of their own; according to the tribal council, this was a 
treasonous attempt at a coup and warranted disenrollment.183 
Aside from the grounds presented for the removal of the 
reservation residents, there is ample reason to believe that this, like 
many other mass disenrollment actions was prompted by a struggle 
for economic control. In the months prior to the disputed election, 
the Elem Tribal Council submitted a proposal concerning the right 
to establish a casino on North Mare Island to the City of Vallejo, a 
document in which their traditional homeland is described as 
polluted to the point that it is “worse than useless.”184 This push for 
capital gains is a reflection of the council’s departure from tradition 
and a self-proclaimed philosophy in which “the present is sacred and 
the past is just a memory.”185 
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For Robert Geary, who has devoted himself to the 
preservation of the culture and traditions of the greater Pomo 
community, and the others who reside there, the reservation is more 
than just a home—it is a sacred site; it is a place of ceremony, and it 
provides them with the cultural resources they need in order to 
thrive.186 For those living on the Clear Lake reservation, the land of 
their ancestors is far too valuable for them to part with it for the sake 
of building a casino, particularly when there is little reason to 
believe that any derivative profits would be utilized for the sake of 
those who currently live on the reservation.187 
Although the Elem Indian Colony receives $1,200,000.00 
per year in Revenue Sharing Trust Funds,188 which are distributed 
to non-gaming tribes to fund social services,189 this money is “used 
almost entirely to fund Elem’s government operations.”190 In 
reference to the Vallejo proposal, these operations include funding 
the tribal council’s efforts to obtain an exclusive right to negotiate 
with the city and, potentially, guaranteeing loans and paying for 
consultant services.191 In the meantime, the reservation residents are 
being denied essential services by the tribal council who refuses to 
fund them; they are not even provided with access to waste removal 
services.192 Moreover, when nonmembers contributed funds to help 
the reservation recover from the fire that destroyed several homes in 
Clearlake last year, the funds were withheld from those people 
actually living on the reservation.193 What is revealed in these facts 
is a trend—not exclusive to this tribal organization194—toward 
separating the tribal government, along with its control over the 
tribal economy, from a group that made up roughly one half of the 
tribe’s membership.  
Ironically, the ordinance that could potentially lead to 
disenrollment in this case was drafted by a non-Indian lawyer who 
is vehemently opposed to the idea of disenrollment as punishment. 
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Anthony Cohen, former attorney for Elem Indian Colony, refused to 
draft a disenrollment ordinance for the Elem Indian Colony Tribal 
Council and, instead, convinced the tribe to adopt an ordinance that 
would only include disenfranchisement, banishment, and revenue 
forfeiture while preserving a defendant’s due process rights under 
the ICRA.195 However, when Cohen was informed that the tribe 
planned to engage in mass disenrollment, he capitulated to the tribal 
council’s demands to amend the previously drafted ordinance to 
allow the action to move forward.196 But, in Cohen’s mind, he had 
preserved the rights of those facing disenrollment by including 
reference to ICRA in the ordinance.197 The due process provision of 
that ordinance reads as follows:  
 
Due Process. All persons accused of offenses that 
could subject them to sanctions under this Ordinance 
shall be afforded due process and fundamental 
fairness pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968 (“ICRA”) and this ordinance shall be 
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the 
ICRA.198 
 
According to Cohen, the above language would provide 
those facing disenrollment with a route by which to circumvent 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez; he explains that when tribal 
officials violate ICRA, they act outside of their tribal authority and, 
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therefore, may be sued in state court so long as PL- 280 applies.199 
Cohen describes a suit of this nature as requesting the court to rule 
that such an official is acting/speaking only in his or her individual 
capacity and to enjoin that individual from speaking for his or her 
tribe while holding them liable for defamation.200 Cohen provides 
no support for his claim other than the following quote from 
Borisclair v. Superior Court: “In general, the agent of a sovereign 
may be held liable when he acts in excess of his authority or under 
an authority not validly conferred.”201 While the grist of Cohen’s 
argument is agreeable, it falls prey to several flaws in application: 
(1) Martinez, at least by extension, bars extratribal judiciaries from 
interpreting ICRA on the behalf of tribes;202 (2) actions taken by a 
tribal council are not likely to be attributed to an official in his or 
her individual capacity;203 and (3) there appears to be no precedent 
for an action of this sort. However, Cohen’s aim to shield tribal 
members from unjust disenrollment is an admirable one that is 
shared by ethically-minded tribal attorneys serving throughout 
Indian country, and, sadly, the perpetual frustration of this aim is not 
uncommon.  
 Although the protections that Cohen sought to have formally 
recognized would likely be inadequate, his efforts indicate that he 
believes that the actions of tribal officials must be rooted in the 
collective will of the membership of their tribes. To suggest that 
tribal officials are acting outside the scope of their authority—when 
an ordinance could be interpreted as validating their actions—is to 
suggest that the legally valid actions of such officials must also be 
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validated by the will of tribal members in order for them to be 
effective manifestations of tribal authority. However, recognition of 
this limitation on the authority of tribal officials cannot be left 
entirely to the courts, particularly when this recognition depends 
upon a nuanced interpretation of ICRA. 
 
C.   The Indian Civil Rights Act as a Potential Defense 
Against Disenrollment 
 
ICRA is probably the most cited grounds for defending 
against an action to disenroll or banish tribal members. Disenrollees 
tend to rely upon the section of that Act codified as 25 U.S.C. § 
1302(a)(8),204 which reads as follows: “No Indian tribe exercising 
the powers of self-government shall deny to any person the equal 
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property 
without due process.”205 However, federal courts elaborating on the 
holding in Martinez have explained that ICRA “[can]not be 
interpreted to impliedly create a federal cause of action against an 
Indian tribe or its officers for deprivation of the Act’s substantive 
rights.”206 In particular, the Court in Martinez—which concerned 
the topic of membership but did not touch that of disenrollment—
explained that 25 U.S.C. § 1302 does not, on its face, “purport[] to 
subject tribes to the jurisdiction of federal courts.”207 Moreover, 
courts have held that, in spite of the language of 25 U.S.C. § 1302, 
the holding in Martinez “foreclosed any reading of [ICRA] as 
authority for bringing civil actions in federal court to request . . . 
forms of relief [other than habeas corpus].”208  
In spite of prior rulings concerning actions based on 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8), there is one case in which a federal court 
allowed that section of the Act to direct its ruling: Sweet v. 
Hintzman.209 In that case, Petitioners argued that the Respondents—
collectively the Snoqualmie Tribal Council—violated rights 
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guaranteed to the Petitioners under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8).210 In 
particular, the Petitioners alleged that the Respondents violated their 
rights to due process in the following ways:  
 
(a) by not providing adequate formal notice of the 
April 27, 2008 banishment meeting to Petitioners; 
(b) by making false charges against Petitioners; (c) 
by not providing an opportunity for the Petitioners to 
be heard at the April 27, 2008 banishment meeting; 
and (d) by not following their own procedures for 
voting on banishment.211  
 
Based on these allegations, the court found that the Petitioners had 
been denied procedural due process and granted the Petitioners a 
writ of habeas corpus.212 From this, we can reason that, while 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) does not provide any positive form of relief, it 
may be used to justify granting a writ of habeas corpus.  
The other section of ICRA implicated in Sweet and other 
similar cases is 25 U.S.C. § 1303, which provides that “[t]he 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any 
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his 
detention by order of an Indian tribe.”213 Unlike 25 U.S.C. § 
1302(a)(8), this section of ICRA explicitly provides a form of relief 
that may be granted to potential disenrollees by an extra-tribal 
judiciary. The case Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians 
provides some indication as to the grounds for granting this form of 
relief in the disenrollment context.  
In Poodry, the Petitioners allegedly formed a rogue faction 
after accusing Respondent members of the Tonawanda Council of 
Chiefs of “misusing tribal funds, suspending tribal elections, 
excluding members of the Council of Chiefs from the tribe's 
business affairs, and burning tribal records.”214 In response, the 
council declared the Petitioners guilty of treason and sent between 
fifteen and twenty individuals to eject them from the reservation 
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and, in doing so, effect orders of disenrollment and banishment 
brought against them.215 While the attempt was unsuccessful, those 
allied with the council engaged the Petitioners in a campaign of 
assault and harassment.216 This prompted the Petitioners to file for 
writs of habeas corpus under 25 U.S.C. § 1303.217  
In reviewing the case, the court in Poodry establish the 
elements required in order for a court to grant the relief requested. 
First, the court held that such a request would only be valid if the 
underlying sanction was criminal, rather than civil, in nature.218 
Second, a petitioner must demonstrate that the challenged sanction 
constituted a “sufficiently severe potential or actual restraint on 
liberty”;219 however, “actual physical custody is not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite for federal habeas review.”220 Rather, those facing 
banishment or disenrollment may successful petition for habeas 
relief insofar as they may, at any point in time, be compelled to leave 
the reservation and barred from ever returning; such a restraint is not 
generally imposed upon the members of a tribe and may, therefore, 
be considered an undue restraint on the liberty of tribal members.221  
While both Sweet and Poodry suggest that ICRA may 
provide a route by which potential disenrollees can preserve their 
membership in a tribe, it is important to note that any such 
protections offered by ICRA are not absolute. There are many cases 
that directly oppose the rulings mentioned above.222 Some courts 
have asserted that disenrollment cannot be equated to the detainment 
required for a grant of habeas relief under 25 U.S.C. § 1303,223 
whereas others have ruled that—even when Poodry does apply—
disenrollment coupled with only a partial exclusion from tribal 
resources and facilities does not constitute a “sufficiently severe 
restraint on liberty to constitute detention and invoke federal habeas 
jurisdiction under ICRA.”224  
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In spite of the aforementioned legal barriers, it is 
unquestionably appropriate to invoke ICRA as the legal 
representative of potential disenrollees. On its face, ICRA was 
clearly meant to prevent the diminishment of the rights of tribal 
members, and disenrollment actions jeopardize those rights in toto. 
Arguably, all tribal advocates—attorneys representing tribes and 
their members—ought to challenge interpretations of ICRA that 
render the protections recognized in that Act ineffective. 
Although ICRA-based litigation strategies may vary in 
effectiveness depending on jurisdiction, this caselaw, Sweet in 
particular, may inform the drafting of constitutional or tribal code 
amendments to address the problem of unjust disenrollment. A 
lesson we can learn from Sweet is that a tribe’s failure to provide 
defendants with adequate due process negatively affects both sides 
of any litigation involving a tribal party. What this means for tribes, 
is that specific due process protections, at the very least, ought to be 
codified. In particular, tribes should formally recognize the rights to 
notice and hearing, counsel, and appeal and, in doing so, define the 
scope of those rights. The benefits of such codifications for tribal 
defendants is obvious, but tribes benefit from this process in two 
ways: (1) Courts will be less likely to overrule tribal sentencing on 
due process grounds, and (2) robust due process protections create 
tribal remedies that must be exhausted before tribal actions may be 
challenged in federal court. Rather than merely inserting ICRA into 
a tribal constitution (which would have minimal effect because the 
statute already creates a legal duty), tribes should attempt to provide 
their own express interpretations of 25 U.S.C. § 1302 in their 
constitutions or tribal codes to the extent that they would like to 
preserve the rights therein for their members and partially immunize 
themselves from extra-jurisdictional challenges. However, reliance 
upon ICRA is reactionary and, therefore, is unlikely to prevent the 
initiation of disenrollment actions. Further, in order for 
constitutional amendments advanced by the general membership of 
a tribe to be adopted, members must be able to call special meetings 
to encourage their adoption and the tribal franchise must be both 
protected and honored.225 
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D.   The Nooksack Tribe and Holdover Councils 
 
Another egregious example of disenfranchisement lies in the 
disenrollment proceedings at Nooksack. Those proceedings concern 
the mass disenrollment of 331 tribal members, 306 of whom are 
descended from Annie George, the biological daughter of Nooksack 
Chief Matsqui George.226 These descendants of Annie George, 
known collectively as the Nooksack 306, were actively recruited by 
tribal leadership to return to their traditional homeland to help justify 
the tribe’s application for federal recognition.227 Although this 
recruitment was presumably prompted in-part by the acknowledged 
tribal ancestry of the Nooksack 306, the tribal council continues to 
seek to disenroll them because Annie George was not included on a 
1942 federal census.228 Over time, these disenrollments have been 
challenged on several grounds.229  
To preserve and enforce these disenrollment orders, the 
Nooksack Tribal Council— which was headed by an adoptee with 
no biological connection to the tribe230—has perpetually denied the 
voting rights of its members. When the terms of the disenrolling 
councilpersons had expired, they refused to vacate office.231 
Because those terms had expired, the council was unable to form a 
quorum necessary for the conducting of tribal business.232 To 
remedy the issue, the council amended tribal law to allow for a mail-
in voting process and then filed a motion to deprive the potential 
disenrollees of their rights to vote.233 When Nooksack Tribal Court 
(NTC) Chief Judge Susan Alexander suggested that she would deny 
the motion, the council cancelled their planned election.234 The 
council then announced that it would postpone the election until 
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after disenrollment.235 After Chief Judge Alexander suggested that 
she would compel the election, the tribal council amended the 
Nooksack Tribal Code to bar plaintiffs’ counsel from practicing in 
NTC and eventually fired Alexander only to replace her with their 
in-house counsel Raymond Dodge.236 
The procedural backdrop for the Nooksack disenrollment 
cases clearly shows that when the tribal franchise is selectively 
limited or entirely eliminated, there are no safeguards against the 
overreach of tribal councils. It also shows that the disenrollment 
epidemic is deeply rooted in the denial of the popular sovereignty 
that lies at the heart of traditional tribal self-governance and is the 
undisputed source of tribal sovereignty. For this reason, both 
proponents of a brand of tribal sovereignty that entails complete 
control over determinations concerning membership and opponents 
of unjust disenrollment ought to encourage constitutional 
amendments that preserve the traditional source of sovereignty 
under UNDRIP and due process rights under ICRA by reinforcing 
the tribal franchise. 
 
E.   The Pechanga Band: The Invalidation of Expert Opinions 
and Moratoriums on Disenrollment 
 
 One last case that illustrates the importance of preserving the 
tribal franchise through preemptive measures is Jeffredo v. 
Macarro. According to the Appellants in Jeffredo, roughly twenty-
five percent of the Pechanga Tribe’s general membership had been 
disenrolled between the years of 2002—when the Tribe opened its 
San Diego casino237—and 2007.238 In the last wave of 
disenrollments, the validity of which is the subject of the litigation, 
approximately 200 adults and 200 children were disenrolled.239 This 
action was not the result of careful investigation into the Appellants’ 
claims to membership, nor was it an expression of the will of the 
Tribe’s general council; instead this action was initiated by a simple 
vote of an “Enrollment Committee.”240 
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Two factors set the Pechangan disenrollment dispute apart 
from those mentioned above. Firstly, the Pechanga Tribal Council—
through the actions of its enrollment committee—acted directly 
against the proclaimed will of the general membership. Secondly, 
the tribal council disregarded anthropological evidence verifying the 
Appellants’ claims to membership. While the tribal council was 
deciding to pursue disenrollment, the Pechanga General 
Membership, from whom the powers of Pechangan governance 
originate, voted to institute a moratorium on disenrollment 
actions.241 Although the petition underlying the moratorium was 
written in support of the Appellants and purposed with putting an 
end to all current and future disenrollments, the tribal council and 
its Enrollment Committee ruled by executive fiat that the 
moratorium would not apply to the Appellants.242 
In order to justify its actions, the tribal council hired Dr. John 
R. Johnson of the Santa Barbara Natural History Museum to 
determine whether the Appellants’ common ancestor, Paulina 
Hunter, was a genuine member of the Tribe.243 According to Dr. 
Johnson, his findings were largely disregarded by the tribal 
council.244 His interpretation of the data he collected is that 
“[t]he preponderance of the evidence indicates that Paulina Hunter’s 
father was Mateo Quasacac, who was the only Indian listed as 
having been born at ‘Pichanga’ in the surviving early records  of 
Mission San Luis Rey.”245 Instead of concluding that this was 
evidence of the fact that Paulina Hunter and her descendants are 
Pechangan, the tribal council ruled that “the correct tribal ancestry 
of Paulina Hunter was San Luis Rey” rather than Pechanga 
Temecula.246 This ruling completely disregards the fact that the 
genealogies of virtually all members of the Tribe can be, according 
to mission records, traced back to San Luis Rey; it also contradicts 
evidence indicating that Restituta, Paulina Hunter’s maternal 
grandmother, was born at the original village of Temecula.247  
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Feeling that the facts clearly demonstrated that they had been 
unjustly disenrolled, the Appellants in Jeffredo maintained an 
argument that they were entitled to habeas relief under ICRA 
because their collective disenrollment amounted to an unlawful 
detention.248 The court rejected this argument as being a basis for 
federal court jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the court held that 
the Appellants’ disenrollment was not tantamount to detention 
because they were not restrained from accessing the Pechanga 
Reservation and could continue to access the property they held 
therein.249 Second, the court held that because the Appellants had 
not been so excluded, they had not exhausted tribal remedies to such 
an action as would be required for a federal court to assume 
jurisdiction over the matter.250 The court indicated no concern with 
the fact that the tribe could do nothing to regain their membership 
rights other than bring a claim in federal court. 
Because both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the 
Appellants acknowledged that federal courts lack jurisdiction to 
review tribal membership decisions,251 it is important to recognize 
that it is possible for tribal officials to constrain facts and the 
legislative authority of their general membership to serve personal 
ends that are wholly divorced from the will of the tribe. When 
genuine members of any tribe face disenrollment and the unified 
will of their tribal community, as expressed through the tribal 
franchise and recognized in a tribal constitution, cannot preserve 
their personal, cultural, and biological identities, they have no 
choice but to turn to litigation. Here, the Appellants exhausted the 
remedies provided by the tribe and were left with no other option 
than to bring their challenge to federal court. Ideally, such recourse 
would be amenable to the best argument. However, the only 
argument to which the federal judiciary is—and arguably ought to 
be—receptive is an ICRA-based challenge alleging that petitioners 
have been detained. As Jeffredo and other cases illustrate, such 
challenges have a tendency to prove futile in the disenrollment 
context. Assuming that the status quo is maintained, this case 
illustrates the fact that the only effective prophylactic for preventing 
unjust disenrollment and the potential spread of this epidemic is 
ensuring that the popular vote of tribal members carries that level of 
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authority that has been recognized in countless tribal constitutions, 
which is the authority from which every other power of governance 
arises: the will of the people. Even if the authority of those facing 
disenrollment is diminished, the remainder of the general 
membership must have some way to challenge those actions of a 
tribal council that it finds unjust. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
 The point of this article is not to challenge the authority of a 
tribal council or its members, rather we must recognize that tribal 
sovereignty originates in the people of the tribes. Some tribal 
officials and tribal advocates have a severely confused interpretation 
of this notion, a notion that the constitutions which they are tasked 
with upholding explicitly recognize. The source of this confusion 
lies in an Anglo-American conception of government where, aside 
from exercising the power to vote, citizens and their governments 
tend to function independently. Certainly, off-reservation political 
existence entails an ebb and flow between the people-at-large and 
the State, but a tribe and its people are and have always been one. 
For this reason, it is paradoxical to suggest that a tribe could 
represent its interests over those of its members. But this is sadly 
how some in our community justify the practice of disenrollment. 
 How did we get to this point where, to mirror a popular 
epithet, we can’t see the tribe for its members? Arguably, this 
destructive trend began with colonization, but it really took hold 
when, during the Era of Assimilation, the federal government took 
several steps to distinguish “civilized” Indians from “savages” who 
adhered to practices of personal and cultural significance. Part of 
this campaign entailed the prohibition of sacred activities that served 
in-part as the foundations of Native societies, prohibitions that 
would be enforced in Indian courts presided over by Indian judges. 
After diminishing the religious freedoms of those Indians that 
resided within its ambit, the federal government sought to deprive 
Indians of the freedoms of choosing how to live and how to expend 
their labor. This was the state of things in Indian country when the 
IRA was enacted. 
 While the IRA was purposed with recognizing the right of 
the tribes to govern themselves, this legislation came at a time when 
the foundations of Native society had been so thoroughly legislated 
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that it may have been easy to lose sight of them or their importance. 
It is no wonder that many tribes adopting constitutions under this 
Act, having been to some extent deprived of the traditional 
foundations of their societies for generations, modeled their 
governmental structures after the representative form of government 
that could be found outside of Indian country and that was thrust 
upon them by the Department of the Interior. While many of the 
constitutions adopted under the IRA recognized that sovereignty 
originated in the general membership of the tribes, they also 
recognized that this sovereignty would be almost entirely vested in 
tribal councils; still, the foundation of governmental authority was 
recognized as remaining in the people.  
 Sadly, without recognition of this authority, which—as is the 
case in Anglo-American society—can for many tribal members only 
be recognized and exercised through the franchise, every other 
derivative right of the general membership of a tribe can be either 
diminished or extinguished. However, when the actions of tribal 
councils are amenable to the will of the people, as expressed through 
the popular vote, these rights can be preserved in perpetuity. Not 
only does recognition of this fact protect the genuine members of 
tribes from unjust disenrollment, it also protects the root and 
expression of sovereignty as it is recognized in both Anglo-
American and Native societies. To dispute this is not to recognize 
the inherent sovereignty of a tribe, it is to diminish it. For this reason, 
it is important that tribes formally establish constitutional 
protections for tribal voting rights and approval requirements for the 
types of membership decisions that could potentially jeopardize 
tribal sovereignty. 
 
